COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 4, No. 11 February 7, 1968

DOCUMENT

Defense Study Evaluates Effect Of RVN Defoliation

A DOD-sponsored study of the effects of defoliation agents used in Vietnam indicates there is no lasting harm to animals, water supplies or the soil.

Scientists of the Midwest Research Institute who carried out the research based their assessment on information from universities, chemical firms, scientific articles and some findings from controlled tests in Thailand and Puerto Rico.

The researchers reported:

—Partially killed or defoliated trees exhibit a rapid recovery and there is no evidence of irrevocable modification to soil.

—Direct toxicity hazard to humans and animals is "nearly nonexistant."

—No firm conclusions on the effects of herbicides on water, but direct toxic effects would be "highly unlikely."

Concern over the large amounts of herbicides being used in Vietnam led DOD's Advance Research Agency to request the evaluation. Spraying operations, at the request of the Vietnamese government, have been carried out since early 1962.

Three defoliation agents, designated simply as Orange, White and Blue, have been used primarily around jungle-covered Viet Cong strongholds and along rivers, canals and roads to eliminate possible ambush sites.

Other targets have been infiltration routes and supply trails in upland forests, the Demilitarized Zone and crop-

(Continued, Page 4)

Secretary McNamara Delivers FY69 Military Posture Statement

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara presented his FY69 "posture statement" to the Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 1, strongly urging Congress to approve the requested $79.6 billion new obligational authority for Defense matters.

In presenting the "posture" on the FY69-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, Secretary McNamara gave an assessment on the international situation as it bears on military policies and programs, plus a breakdown of military concepts, operations, R&D, and manpower and organization.

COMMENDATION—Lt. Gen. William B. Rosson, Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam (I FFORCEV), affixes the Meritorious Unit Commendation streamer on the unit guidon of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFORCEV Artillery, during ceremonies at Nha Trang.

The secretary delivered the seventh and final Five Year Defense Program and Financial Budget. He noted that a reduction of about $21.7 billion from the original FY69 budget, as requested by the services and Defense Agencies, was made possible by eliminating the unneeded and marginal activities and by deferring whatever can be safely deferred.

On the international assessment review, Secretary McNamara said, "In the seven years since I first came before this Committee to testify on our Defense programs, the military and economic strength of the United States and its allies has increased dramatically.

"But so have the difficulty and complexity of the problems we have had to face in framing our military policies. These years have seen the acceleration of a number of trends which will make the world of the 1970s very different from the world of the early 1960s."

Mr. McNamara said this country's military posture remains rooted in a commitment to collective defense.

"We and our allies are demonstrat-

(Continued, Page 4)

DOD Announces Strength Totals

Defense Department has announced total numerical strength on Dec. 31, 1967 was 3,398,711, an increase from the figure reported on the last day of 1966.

The totals for each service, including regulars and reserves on active duty, officer candidates, cadets at the Military and Air Academies and midshipmen at the Naval Academy, are: Army, 1,463,002; Navy, 746,617; Marines, 298,486; and Air Force, 890,606.

The 1967 figure is about 65,000 more than the 1966 year-end total.

Background for Commanders

Dilemmas of Foreign Policy: Arms for Developing Nations*

In the field of foreign policy we must, on any given issue, juggle staggering arrays of slippery, constantly changing variables:

- Competing interests and views abroad.
- Competing interests and views at home.
- An intricate network of differing interpretations binding them all together.

We must do, as well, a lot of guesswork on the probable course of future events.

Problems in Other Countries

In dealing with any issue we are, of course, guided by that broad and durable set of democratic ideals which have always directed American policy. But it is one thing to have a guiding set of principles or aspirations. It is another to apply them to the particular foreign policy problem that arises. For in each case the options open to us may be sharply curtailed by the actions, objectives, and desires of sovereign countries which are beyond our control and often even our influence.

It is important to remember that we are not the only country in the world with domestic political problems. For some peculiar reason all those other countries we deal with seem to have their problems, too. So it is not enough to judge an issue simply on what appears to be its merits. One has to keep in mind as well how people—both here and abroad—perceive it. And it is not unusual to find the leader of a foreign country who might agree with you about the wisdom of a particular course of action. But if he went ahead and acted on it, his government could not survive.

Considerations of this kind as much as our own desires are the determinants of our policies. And it is in the context of these restraints that our policies must be hammered out.

Often someone will say: "Well, if such and such a country won't do what we like, let's just cut off our aid." What they don't realize is that such a step would not only be offensive but self-defeating. Our ultimate purpose—peaceful evolution and development—is hardly served by action which can only bring about the reverse results.

There is, therefore, often no direct road leading to our most cherished foreign policy objectives. And such roads as do exist are hazardous and pockmarked.

I think the best way to drive home what I am saying is to take a concrete example. I have chosen what I think is a particularly striking one: the difficult question of if, how, and when we should supply arms to developing countries.

What we would like to see happen is simple enough. We would like to see these countries spend their scarce resources on domestic developments and economic progress rather than frittering them away on expensive military equipment. In President Johnson's words, the resources being put into arms all around the world "might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and teaching the uneducated."

There are other reasons I can cite why we should, in principle, oppose the acquisition of arms by developing countries:

- Any arms buildup, once begun, takes on its own dynamic, shape, and logic. It gets easily out of hand. The acquisition of new arms in one country leads to demands for new equipment by its neighbors, whether for reasons of prestige, national pride, or simply to maintain what they see as a satisfactory military balance.
- Second, the arms made available to developing countries, with their fragile political institutions, may undermine democratic governments, may encourage military coups, or may shore up military dictatorships.
- Third, the tension resulting from an arms race in an area may increase the power, stature, or belligerency of a nation's military leadership.

Having laid out all these neat principles and arguments, however, we are still forced to examine how they can be usefully and responsibly applied in given instances.

Let us take three areas of the world, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and Latin America, as case studies.

No Easy Answers in South Asia

Case number 1: The India subcontinent. Few areas of the world exist where the case for arms limitation seems more compelling. Arms escalation by either India or Pakistan is considered a threat to its security by the other.

Relations between the two countries are made more difficult by the facts of geography. Their territories are intertwined and isolated from the rest of Asia by the world's most formidable chain of mountains. Until Communist China's forays over the border in 1962, India had virtually discounted any threat to its security other than that from Pakistan.

U.S. military assistance to the subcontinent dates back to the mid-1950's. Initially, it was confined to Pakistan—as part of a world-wide strategy of support for non-Communist countries on the perimeter of the Soviet Union and mainland China.

After 1962, when India was attacked by Red China, we acceded to Indian requests for limited military assistance, taking care to limit our aid to equipment required for defense of its northern frontier.

When the longstanding feud over Kashmir burst into open war two years ago, we ended all deliveries of military equipment. We have not resumed grant materiel assistance to either country. . . . Furthermore, we have tried to induce major arms suppliers—the U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, France, and Western Germany—to follow similar restraints.

On the other hand, we have agreed to resume the sale

of spare parts on equipment previously furnished by the United States—on a carefully restricted case-by-case basis when we are convinced that doing so will reduce military budgets. This may seem a paradox, but it is a very important factor to keep in mind.

The truth is that we cannot prevent these countries from acquiring equipment they consider essential to their own defense. If we refuse to provide spare parts for such equipment we have furnished them at some point in the past, they have two choices open to them: to buy these spare parts through unofficial channels—there exists a black market for arms and spare parts—or to scrap the United States equipment altogether and buy new equipment from some other source—Europe, Communist China, or the Soviet Union. Thus, either way they will spend many times what they would have spent in buying from the United States. And should we bow out entirely as supplier, by even refusing spare parts for what they consider equipment vital to their security, our ability to exercise restraint would be greatly reduced.

What does the future hold for an arms limitation agreement on the Indian subcontinent?

Despite our efforts, major obstacles still stand in the way of agreement. Tension over Kashmir continues. After the Tashkent declaration of January 1966, with both India and Pakistan forswearing the use of force in future dealings, we expected an improvement in relations and a settlement of outstanding political differences. Hopes on both counts have not so far been fulfilled.

Secondly, both India and Pakistan view the acceptable force levels of the other power very differently. India believes it must be strong enough to hold off both incursions by Communist China and an attack by Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not take Indian claims of a Chinese military threat very seriously and is therefore unwilling to see India's military strength, already numerically superior, further increased.

Third, other nations have resumed delivery of military supplies: the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to India; Communist China and various European countries to Pakistan.

Clearly then, the problems of arms control on the Indian subcontinent are not given to easy answers. And equally clearly, our own policy is not the determining factor in this situation. Nevertheless, we will continue to search for ways to prevent an arms spiral in South Asia.

Arms Policy Toward the Middle East

Case number 2: At times, withholding arms serves neither the cause of peace nor of stability. This is demonstrated by the Middle East.

In this trouble area our historic purpose has also been to search for arms limitations. . . . However, the U.S.S.R. began large-scale arms shipments to the area in 1955, [and] has remained the single major factor in the Mideastern arms scene ever since.

Over the past 12 years, the U.S.S.R. has provided well over $2 billion worth of military equipment to countries of the Mideast. It was first to introduce heavy tanks and bombers into the area.

The military imbalance threatened by these Soviet deliveries caused the other countries in the area to seek military aid in the West. Even so, most Western arms going to the Middle East, both to Israel and moderate Arab states, came from European nations, not the United States. Only in a few cases have we provided U.S. equipment—where it seemed essential to do so to help friendly governments provide for their own defense.

The Arab-Israeli war in June made matters worse. We immediately suspended shipments to both Israel and the Arab states, hoping that other countries would match our restraint. Once again our hopes were disappointed.

The Soviets not only replaced a major part of the arms lost by the Arab states; they also began offering arms to those Arab states with which we have had long and friendly ties. This development forced us to resume limited and selective arms deliveries to the area under agreements concluded prior to the hostilities.

Case number 3: Latin America. By any reasonable standard, our policy of limiting arms in Latin America has been a great success. We have been able to convince Latin American leaders that their external threat was minimal and that they should give their major attention to internal security and economic and social development.

As elsewhere, however, our power to influence the decisions of sovereign nations has its limits. We cannot, even if we would like to, dictate to them what their policy should be. Our influence is limited to our power to persuade; and our ability to persuade is dependent upon the good will, the confidence and trust we enjoy with the leaders, governments, and people of these countries.

If a country is convinced that its security is threatened and judges its arms requirements differently than we do, our ability to affect its decisions is very limited.

Several Latin American governments are now considering whether to purchase new, more advanced fighter aircraft. Their military commands are concerned about maintaining professional standards and training. They believe they require aircraft for counterinsurgency operations. And they are troubled, as well, by the problem of keeping abreast of a rapidly advancing field of technology, a technology which also has civilian applications. We are still considering the situation that would arise should these countries decide to acquire aircraft.

In these three cases, then, you have the dilemma of foreign-policy making neatly presented. Adhering too rigidly and unswervingly to what is our basic policy—to avoid the supply of expensive and sophisticated military equipment to developing countries—might, in fact, help to defeat the aims of our policy. This is the paradox—but one example of the paradoxes and complexities we daily face.

Each situation has its own problems, its own requirements, its own constraints. . . . So each problem must be considered separately, yet every one must be related to every other. Unthinking adherence to any principle or doctrine, no matter how noble, not only can be self-defeating, it can defeat the underlying ultimate purpose of the principle itself.

---

* *Excerpts from a recent address by Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.*

AF Seeks Applications For Air Attache Posts

Air Force continues to seek applications from captains through colonels to fill coming vacancies in air attache positions in 1970. Application deadline is July 31. Selections will be made late in 1968 for personnel to enter training in 1969.

Current policy precludes consideration of Code 1 pilots, unless they have completed a tour in Southeast Asia. However, this does not prevent a pilot from applying, since application should be on file before going to Southeast Asia in order to be considered for an assignment compatible with the end of the SEA tour.

Navigators are ineligible for attache duty. There is no rated requirement for them and the demand for navigators does not permit their removal from the Air Force rated inventory for the period of an attache assignment.

Further details on application procedures and assignment areas are available from local personnel offices.

Defoliation Study

(Continued from Page 1)

lands in remote areas long occupied by the Viet Cong.

In the first defoliation operation, 5,000 acres were sprayed and 750 acres of cropland were covered. Since then the pace has picked up significantly, and in 1967 enough herbicide was used in Vietnam to treat nearly one million acres.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Published semi-weekly by Armed Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD(M&RA). Reproduction of content is authorized. Suggested dateline for materials used is WASHINGTON (AFPS).

McNamara 'Posture' Statement

(Continued from Page 1)

ing this commitment every day in Vietnam," he explained.

"But today, and tomorrow, our country must be prepared to cope with a complex range of contingencies requiring forces and weapons systems with very diverse capabilities."

Dealing with missile philosophy, Secretary McNamara said the Soviet Union and the United States have the strongest possible motives to avoid a strategic nuclear war.

"To put it bluntly," the secretary stated, "neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can now attack the other, even by complete surprise, without suffering massive damage in retaliation."

He pointed out that deterrence remains the "cornerstone of our nuclear policy."

Deterring aggression is more than weapons, the secretary noted. As he put it, "an unwavering will to use these forces in retaliation to a nuclear attack upon ourselves and our allies."

He said this is what provides the deterrent.

As for ICBM, he indicated the U.S. still has the same three or four-to-one missile edge—more than enough to deter any nuclear enemy.

He said in overall terms the missile forces being proposed by DOD for the FY69-73 period are essentially the same as discussed last year—1,000 Minuteman, 496 Poseidon and 160 Polaris, plus 54 Titan IIs. Within these overall numbers, however, some changes in mix and payload are being proposed.

No change is proposed in the manned bomber forces.

In the area of manpower, the secretary said maximum emphasis is placed on voluntary recruitment programs. He noted, because of the high enlistment levels, only the Army has had to resort to induction during the past year and a half.

In the officer corps, the secretary said, active duty officer candidat training will continue to provide significant portion of the new officer required in FY68 and FY69.

It is expected that 34,000 new off cers will be obtained through thes programs in FY68, 19,000 being Arm officers. In FY69, this source is ex pected to provide 23,500 officers— 10,000 Army, 7,000 Navy, 3,500 Ma rine Corps, and 3,000 Air Force. Th Senior Reserve Officers Trainin Corps is another source of commi sioned officers.

In the area of pay, Secretary Mc Namara noted that the President' FY69 budget, under government-wid contingencies, includes the funds re quired to support the automatic Jul 1, 1968 pay increase, enacted as par of last year's pay bill.

Secretary McNamara explained th status of other DOD programs— Project 100,000; Project Transition Equal Opportunity; Cost Reduction.

The secretary noted that of the ap propriations required for FY69, th following amounts will be presente separately:

- $540 million for Military Assist ance and Foreign Military Sales.
- More than $2 billion for Militar Construction and Family Housin (including the $82.6 million for pay ment of mortgage principal and $11. million for Homeowners Assistance.
- $76.8 million for Civil Defense.

Also included in the total of new appropriations requested for FY6 is $75 million for three items of pro posed legislation, being submitte separately.

The first, $34 million, is for an in crease in the per diem and travel al lowances for uniformed service mem bers.

The second, $23 million, is for a increase in Servicemen's Group Lif Insurance. The third, $18 million, i to provide Federal employee status fo the civilian technicians of the Army and Air Force National Guard.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price 5 cents (single copy). Subscription Price: $2.50 per year; $3.25 additional for foreign mailing.